Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility

Abrol Fairweather · Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

American and British philosophers have recently broken new ground in exploring how the nature of knowledge can be normative (i.e. moral). Virtue Epistemology is a new movement receiving the bulk of recent attention from top epistemologists and ethicists; this volume reflects the best work in that vein. Included are unpublished articles by such eminent philosophers as Robert Audi, Simon Blackburn, Alvin Goldman, Christopher Hookway, Keith Lehrer, and Ernest Sosa.

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References

1987The Rationality of Emotion 1999XIV—Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error 1990Patterns of Moral Complexity.1999Intention and Weakness of Will 1991Aristotle: The Desire to Understand.2002Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce

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2015Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality 2003How to be a Virtue Epistemologist 2014Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem 2007Collective Epistemic Virtues 2018What's Epistemically Wrong with Conspiracy Theorising?2023Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe 2015RELIABILISM, VERITISM, AND EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM 2003The Structure of Virtue

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