The Development of Trust and Mistrust in Mixed-Motive Games

Abstract

An improvement of Scheff's (1967) theory of consensus formation as a solution to mixed-motive games is proposed. It is not necessary to assume a motivation to coordinate, as Scheff does, and the theory described here allows for the development of a noncooperative consensus as well as the development of a cooperative consensus. Second, Scheff does not show how consensus grows over time. This paper attempts to account for the development of cooperative and noncooperative consensus through the gradual creation or destruction of trust between the players, where the level of trust at any time is a function of the past interaction in the game and in turn determines future interaction. Also, an index of caution, based on the values in the game, is developed to account for the first strategy choices.

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