Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism

Michael Bergmann

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

Michael Bergmann provides a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism, developing his theory of justification by imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement.

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2011CIRCULARITY, RELIABILITY, AND THE COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY OF PERCEPTION 2019Knowing Our Limits 2014VARIETIES OF EXTERNALISM 2019Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism 2014If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too 2018Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat 2016Epistemological Problems of Perception 2020An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge

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