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When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
8 references·4 citing·44 second hop
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (1998)When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)The Folk Theorem with Imperfe…Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests (1993)Reputation and Equilibrium Ch…Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (1992)Maintaining a Reputation when…Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (1989)Reputation and Equilibrium Se…Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players (1988)Open-loop and closed-loop equ…Reputation and imperfect information (1982)Reputation and imperfect info…Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis (1982)Limit Pricing and Entry under…Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets (1980)Noncooperative price taking i…How Efficient are Decentralized Auction Platforms? (2016)How Efficient are Decentraliz…Anonymous markets and monetary trading (2007)Anonymous markets and monetar…Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games (2001)Large Nonanonymous Repeated G…Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence (2000)Pivotal Players and the Chara…Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)Commitment and observability in games (1995)Who Wants a Good Reputation? (2001)Reputation and Competition (2002)Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty (1985)Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents (1990)Contracting with Externalities (1999)Advances in Economic Theory (1983)Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games (1983)A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs (1988)Chapter 5 Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview (1989)Computervermittelter Wissensaustausch als Soziales Dilemma: Ein Überblick (2013)Assessing the Gains from International Macroprudential Policy Cooperation (2021)A Theory of Oligopoly (1964)A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames (1971)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets (1984)Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the number of Firms (1998)Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. (1971)Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency (1984)The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look (1984)Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures (1987)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information (1984)On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting (1988)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects (2009)Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness (2012)On Money as a Medium of Exchange (1989)Social Norms and Community Enforcement (1992)A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis (2005)Efficient monetary allocations and the illiquidity of bonds (2006)Gift Exchange versus Monetary Exchange: Theory and Evidence (2014)Money and Credit Redux (2016)The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms (2003)A survey of trust and reputation systems for online service provision (2005)Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment (1999)Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (1999)When is reputation bad? (2006)Game Theory of Mind (2008)Optimal Information Disclosure (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982Reputation and imperfect information3,093 cited
  • 1982Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis1,038 cited
  • 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
  • 1989Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player483 cited
  • 1992Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed311 cited
  • 1993Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests110 cited
  • 1980Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets99 cited
  • 1988Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players68 cited

Cited by

  • 2007Anonymous markets and monetary trading92 cited
  • 2000Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence66 cited
  • 2001Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games38 cited
  • 2016How Efficient are Decentralized Auction Platforms?34 cited

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