Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed

Drew Fudenberg · David K. Levine

311 citations0/0 files storedThe Review of Economic Studies

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Game Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to 1, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy.

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References

1982Reputation and imperfect information 1982Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model 1982Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence 1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information 1978The Chain Store Paradox 1985Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information

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2001Who Wants a Good Reputation?2002Reputation and Competition 1995Commitment and observability in games 2003Bad Reputation 2004Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 2018Quality and Pricing Decisions in a Market with Consumer Information Sharing 2003

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