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An Economic Analysis of the Choice between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents
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  • 1995Vicarious liability under a negligence rule67 cited
  • 1997The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees64 cited
  • 2019Environmental Law and Economic. Theory and Practice

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35 cited
  • 2019Modelling organisational vicarious liability21 cited