The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law

Robert E. Scott · Paul B. Stephan

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Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems International Law and Human Rights Comparative and International Law Studies

Abstract

Foreword 1. Introduction 2. States, firms, and the enforcement of international law 3. Lessons from contract theory 4. A model of optimal enforcement 5. Patterns of international law enforcement 6. The choice between formal and informal enforcement 7. The future of international law and its enforcement Glossary Table of authorities Index.

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2015Distribution of Responsibilities in International Law

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