Forward induction reasoning revisited

Pierpaolo Battigalli · Amanda Friedenberg

54 citations0/0 files storedTheoretical Economics

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as “rationality and common strong belief of rationality” (RCSBR). Here we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call extensive form best response sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely directed rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2003). We conclude by applying the EFBRS concept to games of interest.

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References

1994A Course in Game Theory 1984Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection 1986On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria 1991Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 2002Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning 1999Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games 1997On Rationalizability in Extensive Games 2003Rationalization and Incomplete Information

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2018Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment 2013The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games

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