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Forward induction reasoning revisited
15 references·3 citing·29 second hopsampled
Forward induction reasoning revisited (2012)Forward induction reasoning revisitedAdmissibility in Games (2008)Admissibility in GamesRationalization and Incomplete Information (2003)Rationalization and Incomplet…Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning (2002)Strong Belief and Forward Ind…Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games (1999)Hierarchies of Conditional Be…Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction (1998)Belief revision in games: for…Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games (1997)Rationality, Nash Equilibrium…Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance (1997)Order Independence for Iterat…On Rationalizability in Extensive Games (1997)On Rationalizability in Exten…Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (1996)Strategic Independence and Pe…A Course in Game Theory (1994)A Course in Game TheoryCommon Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information (1993)Common Belief and the Theory …Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice (1992)Signaling future actions and …Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium (1991)Perfect Bayesian equilibrium …On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)On the Strategic Stability of…Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection (1984)Rationalizable Strategic Beha…Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment (2018)Strategic Reasoning in Persua…Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria (2015)Tenable Strategy Blocks and S…The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games (2013)The order independence of ite…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Sequential Equilibria (1982)Credulity, lies, and costly talk ∗ (2006)Dynamic psychological games (2008)The evolution of overconfidence (2011)Game theory: analysis of conflict (1992)Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory (1999)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Dynamic interactive epistemology (2004)Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology (2007)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS (1988)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Non-cooperative games (1989)Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt (1991)A Theory of Conformity (1994)Games and Decisions (2015)Rationalizable Strategic Behavior (1984)Cheap Talk (1996)Topologies on Types (2005)Interim Correlated Rationalizability (2007)Epistemic Game Theory (2014)Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability (2009)
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References

  • 1994A Course in Game Theory5,468 cited
  • 1984Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection1,407 cited
  • 1986On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria1,402 cited
  • 1991Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium647 cited
  • 2002Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning322 cited
  • 1999Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games220 cited
  • 1997On Rationalizability in Extensive Games204 cited
  • 2003Rationalization and Incomplete Information180 cited
  • 2008Admissibility in Games176 cited
  • 1997Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games175 cited
  • 1998Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction174 cited
  • 1992Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice129 cited
  • 1993Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information108 cited
  • 1997Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance103 cited
  • 1996Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria83 cited

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  • 2018

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Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment
43 cited
  • 2013The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games37 cited
  • 2015Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria34 cited