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When Financial Intermediaries are Corporate Owners: An Agency Model of Institutional Ownership
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When Financial Intermediaries are Corporate Owners: An Agency Model of Institutional Ownership (2000)When Financial Intermediaries are Corpora…External Control of Organizations: Resource Dependence Perspective (2011)External Control of Organizat…The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (2004)The iron cage revisited insti…Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of who and What Really Counts (1997)Toward a Theory of Stakeholde…A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)A Survey of Corporate Governa…A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance (1995)A Stakeholder Framework for A…Competing for the Future (1994)Competing for the FutureAgency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)Agency Theory: An Assessment …Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Large Shareholders and Corpor…Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Financial Intermediation and …The Iron Caged Revisited : Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields (1983)The Iron Caged Revisited : In…The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields (1983)The Iron Cage Revisited: Inst…Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Separation of Ownership and C…Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Agency Problems and the Theor…The Social Psychology of Organizations. (1979)The Social Psychology of Orga…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice (1972)Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony (1977)The Population Ecology of Organizations (1977)Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches (1995)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)STRATEGY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES. (2000)Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness (2007)Opinion Paper: “So what if ChatGPT wrote it?” Multidisciplinary perspectives on opportunities, challenges and implications of generative conversational AI for research, practice and policy (2023)Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness (1985)Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective (2001)Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis (2003)Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business (2003)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Strategic assets and organizational rent (1993)Organizational Information Requirements, Media Richness and Structural Design (1986)The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage (1998)Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation (1990)PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT AT WORK. (1990)A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation (1994)Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)
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References

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  • 1983The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields38,372 cited
  • 2004The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields25,805 cited
  • 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
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  • 2011External Control of Organizations: Resource Dependence Perspective14,181 cited
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  • 1979The Social Psychology of Organizations.12,235 cited
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  • 1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control8,403 cited
  • 1984Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring8,393 cited
  • 1995A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance7,851 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property

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7,361 cited
  • 1994Competing for the Future5,759 cited
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