Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties

Abstract

Political parties are central to current efforts to reform campaign fi? nance in the United States. Party money constitutes approximately half of all campaign funds raised at the national level. Limiting party money is, thus, integral to campaign finance reform. This Article examines what might be gained and lost if regulations on party money are imposed. Proponents of stronger (and better financed) parties conjecture that strong parties increase the ability of voters to hold their representatives accountable. We find that such benefits are, in practice, minimal. Instead, we argue that the main benefits of party money, especially soft money, derive from the parties' cam? paign activities. Soft money finances state party organizations' voter registration and mobilization efforts, which have substantial effects on turnout. Reducing party money will, thus, reduce participation. The benefits oflimitations on party soft money must therefore be weighed against likely reductions in voting that would result.

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