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Chapter 43 Incomplete information
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Chapter 43 Incomplete information (2002)Chapter 43 Incomplete informationTheory of games and economic behavior (2019)Theory of games and economic …Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (2016)Epistemic Conditions for Nash…Games and Decisions (2015)Games and DecisionsGames with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Games with Incomplete Informa…Repeated games with incomplete information (1995)Repeated games with incomplet…Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (1995)Epistemic Conditions for Nash…Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)Correlated Equilibrium as an …The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)The Folk Theorem in Repeated …Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Formulation of Bayesian analy…Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Rational cooperation in the f…Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Agreeing to DisagreeGames with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points (1973)Games with randomly disturbed…Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game (1968)Games with Incomplete Informa…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Games with Incomplete Informa…Knowledge and belief (1962)Knowledge and beliefTheory of Games and Economic Behavior (1945)Theory of Games and Economic …Mechanism for assessing the competitiveness of an industrial enterprise in the information economy (2018)Mechanism for assessing the c…Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1945)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990)Foundations of Social Evolution (1998)A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (2000)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms (2000)ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition (2000)The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms (2003)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)The Grammar of Society (2005)The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism (1971)Characteristics of Organizational Environments and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty (1972)The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life (1983)Toward a positive theory of consumer choice (1980)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)Non-cooperative games (1989)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Evolutionary games on graphs (2007)Representative design and probabilistic theory in a functional psychology. (1955)Features of similarity. (1977)Evolutionary game dynamics (2003)Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence (1982)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Sour Grapes. Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. (1984)Modeling Bounded Rationality (1998)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)
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References

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  • 1995Repeated games with incomplete information536 cited
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    • 2018Mechanism for assessing the competitiveness of an industrial enterprise in the information economy36 cited