Ownership and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Czech Republic

Gerhard Pohl · Stijn Claessens · Simeon Djankov

121 citations0/0 files storedWorld Bank policy research working paper

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Post-Communist Economic and Political Transition Russia and Soviet political economy

Abstract

The Czech Republic's mass-privatization scheme changed the governance of many firms in a short time. The authors show that mass privatization was effective in improving firm management because of the concentrated ownership structure that resulted. For a cross section of 706 firms for the period 1992-95, they find that the more concentrated the firm's ownership, the higher the firm's market valuation and profitability. Large ownership through bank-sponsored investment funds and strategic investors appears to be particularly important in improving corporate governance and turning firms around. They find no evidence that market valuation or profitability were lower for firms in which investment funds sponsored by a firm's main bank represented a large ownership stake. It is often argued that the firm's main bank having (indirect) ownership control could represent a conflict of interest. The empirical analysis here shows, quite the contrary, that such indirect ownership control has a significant positive influence. On balance, banks that had an (indirect) equity stake in a firm have a positive influence on the firm's corporate governance.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 121 citations exist upstream.

References

1997A Survey of Corporate Governance 1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control 1988Management ownership and market valuation 1991The Theory of Capital Structure 1990Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value 1988Managerial control of voting rights 1994The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis 1995Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals

Cited by

2006Industrial Ownership and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China 2002Corporate Networks in Europe and the United States 2009Effects Of Privatization And Ownership In Transition Economies 1999Enterprise performance and management turnover in the Czech Republic 1997Privatization and Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence and Policy Options 2003Post‐Acquisition Restructuring as Evolutionary Process*

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.