Why framing should be all about the impact of goals on cognitions and evaluations

Abstract

In this contribution, I argue that the heart of framing effects lies in the effects that are exerted by goals on cognitive and evaluative processes. Framing is not just a person’s »definition of the situation«, but is also a selective relationship between person and situation: it thus has a strong impact on who you are at that moment, what you like and dislike, what you know, what you see, what you ignore, and what affects you and what leaves you cold. For high-level goals, framing effects are often automatic; they are not a matter of direct choice but are subject to a complex process of selfregulation in which one frame may be apriorily stronger than another (think of problems of self-discipline) and in which »mixed motives« (combination of foreground and background goals) play a vital role. For sociology, the crucial fact is that this process of self-regulation is largely a social product (including the evolution of the brain under social circumstances). Sociology’s microfoundations would have to unfold its genesis and functioning. Quite contrary to the assumptions of »natural« rationality in microeconomics and SEU (Subjective Expected Utility) theory, this view of self-regulation thus leads to the assumption of »social« rationality.

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