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Information Acquisition in a Tax Compliance Game.
8 references·3 citing·41 second hop
Information Acquisition in a Tax Compliance Game. (1993)Information Acquisition in a Tax Complian…Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game (1994)Honesty and Evasion in the Ta…Assessing Audit Risk from Errors and Irregularities (1990)Assessing Audit Risk from Err…The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement (1986)The Tax Compliance Game: Towa…Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance (1986)Equilibrium Verification and …The values of information in some nonzero sum games (1977)The values of information in …The Evaluation and Choice of Internal Information Systems Within a Multiperson World (1975)The Evaluation and Choice of …Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis (1974)Income tax evasion: A theoret…Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis (1972)Income tax evasion: a theoret…Is Tax Transfer Pricing Harmonization a Panacea? Real Effects of Global Tax Transparency and Standards Consistency (2024)Is Tax Transfer Pricing Harmo…Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees (2009)Efficient Committed Budget fo…Does political intention affect tax evasion? (2008)Does political intention affe…Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)The Optimum Enforcement of Laws (1970)Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated? (1995)TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION (2013)The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law (2000)Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects (2002)Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971)Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits (1989)Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance (1998)APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS TO TAX EVASION (2012)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points (1968)Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revisited (2009)Characterizing social value of information (2015)Games and Decisions (2015)Why do people pay taxes? (1992)Consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes (1999)Tax Compliance, Self-Assessment and Tax Administration (2002)FROM THE LAB TO THE FIELD: A REVIEW OF TAX EXPERIMENTS (2017)Of Rule and Revenue (2019)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences (2000)Deception: The Role of Consequences (2005)Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The “slippery slope” framework (2007)The Political Business Cycle (1975)Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy (1977)Moderating role of patriotism on sales tax compliance among Jordanian SMEs (2020)The Moderating Role of Firm Size on the Association between Managerial Ability and Tax Avoidance (2021)Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game (1968)Externalities and Financial Reporting (1980)Capital Budgeting, the Hold-up Problem, and Information System Design (2000)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Divide and Inform: Rationing Information to Facilitate Persuasion (2017)Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions. (1955)A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences (1985)On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria (1986)The effect of time pressure on auditor attention to qualitative aspects of misstatements indicative of potential fraudulent financial reporting (2000)Using Game Theory and Strategic Reasoning Concepts to Prevent and Detect Fraud (2004)Does the severity of a client’s negative environmental, social and governance reputation affect audit effort and audit quality? (2020)Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration (2000)The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1972Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis4,964 cited
  • 1974Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis950 cited
  • 1986The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement402 cited
  • 1994Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game328 cited
  • 1986Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance277 cited
  • 1990Assessing Audit Risk from Errors and Irregularities153 cited
  • 1975The Evaluation and Choice of Internal Information Systems Within a Multiperson World73 cited
  • 1977The values of information in some nonzero sum games43 cited

Cited by

  • 2008Does political intention affect tax evasion?60 cited
  • 2009Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees15 cited
  • 2024Is Tax Transfer Pricing Harmonization a Panacea? Real Effects of Global Tax Transparency and Standards Consistency14 cited

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