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Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate

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References

1951Social Choice and Individual Values.7,792 cited
1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
2014Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix1,418 cited
1989Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election548 cited
1989The computational difficulty of manipulating an election530 cited
1977Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance443 cited
1991Single transferable vote resists strategic voting394 cited
1995Optimal Voting Rules301 cited
1997Exact analysis of Dodgson elections186 cited

Cited by

2008Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem126 cited
2011Multimode Control Attacks on Elections117 cited
2008Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections115 cited
2008Elections Can be Manipulated Often110 cited
2009Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules108 cited
2008Copeland voting: ties matter108 cited

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2008Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability106 cited

2009Where are the really hard manipulation problems? The phase transition in manipulating the veto rule83 cited

2016Barriers to Manipulation in Voting81 cited

2009Sincere‐Strategy Preference‐Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control79 cited