References

• 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
• 1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information12,762 cited
• 1992Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt3,902 cited
• 1995Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance3,641 cited
• 1979On financial contracting2,901 cited
• 1984Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model2,510 cited
• 1998Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis1,881 cited
• 1985Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information1,432 cited
• 2003The effects of government ownership on bank lending1,365 cited
• 1995Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor1,179 cited
• 1990Collateral, loan quality and bank risk1,174 cited
• 1994Corporate distress diagnosis: Comparisons using linear discriminant analysis and neural networks (the Italian experience)1,059 cited
• 1987Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets966 cited
• 1987Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information879 cited
• 1994Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game