Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing

1976-11-01articleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics1,413 citationsclosed

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Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Economic theories and models Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

I. Introduction, 651.—II. The model of borrowing behavior, 652.—III. Lender and market behavior under competitive conditions, 658.—IV. Market solutions under monopoly, 663.—V. Conclusion, 664.—VI. Appendix, 665.

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References

1970The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism

Cited by

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1987Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets

1987Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information

1993Information Sharing in Credit Markets

1986Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing

1996Understanding Financial Crises: A Developing Country Perspective