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On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
16 references·1 citing·38 second hop
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems (2002)On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hid…Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts (1999)Unforeseen Contingencies and …Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Incomplete Contracts: Where d…Implementation and Renegotiation (1999)Implementation and Renegotiat…Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting (1999)Cooperative Investments and t…Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (1998)Foundations of Incomplete Con…Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem (1995)Option Contracts and Renegoti…Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment (1995)Holdups, Standard Breach Reme…Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information (1994)Renegotiation Design with Unv…Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem (1992)Contractual Solutions to the …The theory of contracts (1987)The theory of contractsMonopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Monopoly with Incomplete Info…Bargaining under Asymmetric Information (1984)Bargaining under Asymmetric I…Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Efficient mechanisms for bila…Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems (1982)Optimal coordination mechanis…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsIncentives and incomplete information (1979)Incentives and incomplete inf…Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence (2009)Can Contracts Solve the Hold-…The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Optimal Auction Design (1981)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)The Economics of Welfare (1933)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Contracts and Technology Adoption (2007)Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity (2009)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Foundations of social theory (1990)Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements? (2012)Incentives in Teams (1973)Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983)Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Games and Decisions (2015)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations (1979)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium (2002)Firm‐Specific Human Capital: A Skill‐Weights Approach (2009)The Socialist System (1992)Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence (1997)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Contracts as Reference Points * (2008)Exchange hazards, relational reliability, and contracts in China: The contingent role of legal enforceability (2010)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness (2005)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading2,512 cited
  • 1987The theory of contracts1,330 cited
  • 1999Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?1,200 cited
  • 1984Monopoly with Incomplete Information1,144 cited
  • 1998Foundations of Incomplete Contracts968 cited
  • 1982Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems913 cited
  • 1979Incentives and incomplete information795 cited
  • 1999Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts775 cited
  • 1994Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information572 cited
  • 1999Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting500 cited
  • 1995Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem451 cited
  • 1995Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment401 cited
  • 1992Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem354 cited
  • 1999Implementation and Renegotiation256 cited
  • 1984Bargaining under Asymmetric Information253 cited

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  • 2009Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence17 cited