Judicial Agenda Setting Through Signaling and Strategic Litigant Responses

Vanessa A. Baird · Tonja Jacobi

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Judicial and Constitutional Studies American Constitutional Law and Politics Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

The purpose of this Essay is to present the theory and empirical evidence that strategic interaction between litigants and Justices transforms the U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda. More specifically, it proposes that Supreme Court Justices shape the Court’s agenda by providing signals to litigants about the sort of cases they would like to see, and litigants consider those signals when deciding whether or not to pursue a given case.

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References

1984Agendas, alternatives, and public policies 2002Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999 1996The Global expansion of judicial power 1992The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?1987The Art of Political Manipulation, by William H. Riker 1998The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective 1997The choices justices make 1995Legislative Morality in the American States: The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform

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