Entsteht ein Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle? Der Fall Mannesmann

Abstract

The article examines the development of a market for corporate control in Germany through a case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone-Airtouch. The institutional factors limiting markets for corporate control in Germany through the mid-1990s are described along four dimensions: ownership structure, the influence of banks, codetermination and union strength, and state regulation of corporate law and capital markets. The case of Mannesmann demonstrates how institutional changes have loosened these barriers to hostile takeovers in German corporate governance and facilitated a „free“ market for corporate control. Although claims about the efficiency effects of markets for corporate control remain controversial, hostile takeovers have clear redistributive effects in favor of capital owners. This view predicts a growing diffusion of shareholder-value strategies in Germany as a consequence of an emerging market for corporate control.

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