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As the end result of metaphysics, Kant's constructive mind is not present in the world but withdrawn into the nether world of its representations and constructions. First phenomenology then embodied cognition research sug gested that there could be no cognition without the human body. There is something unsatisfying and lacking, however, in the concept of the body, which undermines the very effort to ground (mathematical) knowledge differently than in the private cogitations of the isolated mind. [1] The purpose of this paper is to articulate a conceptualization of mathemati cal knowledge that is grounded in materialist phenomenology (as developed by Maine de Biran and Henry) and phenome nological sociology (Bourdieu). Most essentially, the approach rests on a shift from the category of the (material) body to that of the flesh. The close relation between cogni tion and the world is possible only when there is flesh, whereas the material body is an insufficient condition for the human mind to emerge, hi other words, current embodiment theories tend not to answer questions about the special char acteristics of those bodies that develop human minds versus those bodies that do not and cannot. In this phenomenological reflection on the conditions of geometrical knowing, I draw on a lesson fragment from a second-grade classroom to exem plify this different conceptualization of mathematical knowing.
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