The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy

Abstract

Appendix to Chapter 2This appendix offers a simple model that more formally characterizes the trade-offs facing members of Congress and the president on the issue of patronage.In particular, the model illustrates why the growth of the federal labor force contributed to the adoption of a merit system, why the president was likely to lead efforts to control the volume of patronage, and which members of Congress were most likely to support passage of the Pendleton Act.In generating these results, it will be assumed that individual members of Congress and the president are all vote maximizers.Following Denzau and Munger (1986) and others, we divide the voting population into two groups: informed and uninformed voters.The former group compares the receipt of government services with taxes levied and, hence, is concerned about the productivity of the federal workforce.In addition, informed voters monitor the voting record of elected officials and keep track of the positions taken by them on various issues.The closer this voting record is to the preferences of the informed voters, the more likely it is that this group of voters will vote in favor of the elected official.In contrast to informed voters, uninformed voters pay no attention to these issues and instead are influenced by campaign advertising, electioneering, canvassing by patronage workers, and, in some cases, the promise of a federal job.The foregoing discussion suggests a model of vote maximization of the formThis equation is designed to capture the behavior of a given member of Congress; a similar model will be constructed for the president.In line with the

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