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Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability · Study

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ArticleMonetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

Eric Schaling1998

Article1998

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

Eric Schaling · Charles R. Nolan

44 citations·0/0 files stored·De Economist

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Economic theories and models

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References

1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target 1992Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence 1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information 1995Optimal contracts for central bankers 2012Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics 1992Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility 1995Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts 1995Modern central banking

Cited by

2002Transparency in Monetary Policy: A Survey 2007The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey 2012The Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context 2010The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey 2003Imperfect transparency and the strategic use of information: an ever present temptation for central bankers?2009Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates

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2002The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independencearticle · 9 shared references 1998The Economics of Central Bankingchapter · 8 shared references 1999Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets under Uncertainty: Why We Might Need Conservative Central Bankersarticle · 8 shared references 2003Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?article · 8 shared references 2003The inflation bias revisited: theory and some international evidencearticle · 7 shared references 1997Independence and Accountabilitychapter · 7 shared references

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Year1998

Typearticle

Published1998-12-01

VenueDe Economist

ISSN-L0013-063X

Languageen

Citations44

Files0 public / 0

ShelfMonetary Policy and Economic Impact

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doi10.1023/a:1003494413926

openalex_workW1587601252

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2010ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES FOR MODEL ROBUSTNESS