References

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• 1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information1,287 cited
• 1995Optimal contracts for central bankers1,131 cited
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• 1997Independence and Accountability135 cited
• 1998Central bank independence: A sensitivity analysis104 cited
• 1990Chapter 21 Rules versus discretion in monetary policy95 cited
• 1998Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences78 cited
• 2000Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique55 cited