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On Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets
9 references·3 citing·47 second hop
On Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets (1987)On Equilibria of Bid-Ask MarketsIndustrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics (2001)Industrial Organization Theor…A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs (1988)A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly…The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium (1986)The scope of the hypothesis o…Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions (1985)Incentive Efficiency of Doubl…A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences (1985)A Bargaining Model with Incom…Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study (1983)Expectations and Reputations …Sequential Equilibria (1982)Sequential EquilibriaPerfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Perfect Equilibrium in a Barg…A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)A Theory of Auctions and Comp…The distribution of information and the price efficiency of markets (2019)The distribution of informati…Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions toCompetitive Equilibrium (2000)Tracking the Invisible Hand: …Random competitive exchange: Price distributions and gains from trade (1985)Random competitive exchange: …COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Optimal Auction Design (1981)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Field Experiments (2004)The Bargaining Problem (1950)Convention: A Philosophical Study. (1970)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment (1996)E XPERIMENTAL M ETHODS IN P OLITICAL S CIENCE (2002)Reputation and Civil War why separatist conflicts are so violent (2009)Two-Person Cooperative Games (1953)Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction (1986)Perfect sequential equilibrium (1986)The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations (2003)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)The assignment game I: The core (1971)Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy. (1975)Dealership market (1980)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces (1988)Pure Strategy Dominance (1993)Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization (2016)Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently (1987)Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices (1997)Bargaining with Incomplete Information (2001)Mathematical Psychics. An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. (1935)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. (1971)Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (1982)Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information (1984)Long-Run Competition in Capacity, Short-Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model (1986)Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples) (2007)Accounting for Incomplete Pass-Through (2009)Auctions and Bidding: A Primer (1989)Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory (1991)Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science (1991)Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable? (1993)The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply (1999)An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (1986)Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles (1987)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model5,287 cited
  • 1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding3,770 cited
  • 1982Sequential Equilibria1,703 cited
  • 1988A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs520 cited
  • 2001Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics475 cited
  • 1985A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences453 cited
  • 1985Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions228 cited
  • 1983Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study134 cited
  • 1986The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium99 cited

Cited by

  • 1985Random competitive exchange: Price distributions and gains from trade59 cited
  • 2000Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions toCompetitive Equilibrium34 cited
  • 2019The distribution of information and the price efficiency of markets22 cited

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