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Environmental Protection, Agency Motivations, and Rent Extraction: The Regulation of Water Pollution in Louisiana

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References

1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
1990Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards410 cited
1988Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation400 cited
1987Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation372 cited
1996Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry368 cited
1991Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining industry181 cited
1990Detection Controlled Estimation147 cited
1982Antitrust Pork Barrel134 cited
1989The Safety Regulation of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Violations, Inspections, and Abnormal Occurrences124 cited
1993Cleaning up the mess: implementation strategies in superfund54 cited

Cited by

2007Enforcement Principles and Environmental Agencies: Principal-Agent Relationships in a Delegated Environmental Program38 cited
1998Penalty Functions for Environmental Violations: Evidence from Water Quality Enforcement38 cited
2008The Impact of Sanctions and Inspections on Firms' Environmental Compliance Decisions31 cited
2002A Theory of Filtered Enforcement30 cited

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