Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners

Jennifer F. Reinganum · Louis L. Wilde

48 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Law Economics and Organization

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Taxation and Compliance Studies Regulation and Compliance Studies Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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Jennifer F. Reinganum, Louis L. Wilde; Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizat

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References

1972Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis 1989Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution 1973Tax evasion: A model 1986The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement 1987Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder 1989Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits 1984Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach 1982Incentive generating state dependent penalty system

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2011Is Knowledge of the Tax Law Socially Desirable?

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