Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution

Dilip Mookherjee B · Ivan Png

583 citations0/0 files storedThe Quarterly Journal of Economics

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Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Taxation and Compliance Studies Auction Theory and Applications

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Dilip Mookherjee, Ivan Png; Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 104, Issue 2, 1 May 1989, Pages 39

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1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification 1980Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems

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