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Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution
2 references·16 citing·52 second hop
Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution (1989)Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistri…Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems (1980)Economically Optimal Performa…Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Optimal contracts and competi…Understanding informal financing (2018)Understanding informal financ…Financing from Family and Friends (2016)Financing from Family and Fri…Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information (2010)Why do borrowers pledge colla…Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly (2004)Presidential Address, Committ…Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption (2004)Inflation, Inflation Variabil…Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration**We are grateful to Wojciech Kopczuk for valuable research assistance. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were received from Jim Alm, Alan Auerbach, Len Burman, Brian Erard, Martin Feldstein, Firouz Gahvari, Roger Gordon, Jim Hines, Jonathan Kesselman, Louis Kaplow, Jim Poterba, Agnar Sandmo, Dan Shaviro, Eric Toder, Gideon Yaniv, the participants at the NYU Law School Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance and the handbook conference held at the University of California at Berkeley. (2002)Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and A…Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable (2000)Optimal Contracts when Enforc…Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeconomic model (2000)Bank structure, capital accum…Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation (1999)Comparing Varieties of Agency…Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance (1998)Tax Evasion and Tax ComplianceInnovation, bank monitoring, and endogenous financial development (1996)Innovation, bank monitoring, …Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue (1996)Auditing claims in the insura…Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game (1994)Honesty and Evasion in the Ta…Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary (1992)Monitoring the monitor: An in…Corruption in tax administration (1992)Corruption in tax administrat…Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits (1989)Delegation as Commitment: The…Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis (1972)Why do people pay taxes? (1992)Consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes (1999)Tax Compliance, Self-Assessment and Tax Administration (2002)FROM THE LAB TO THE FIELD: A REVIEW OF TAX EXPERIMENTS (2017)Of Rule and Revenue (2019)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1988)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations (1991)The Nature of the Firm (1937)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)An assessment of agency theory as a framework for the government–university relationship (2008)Conceptualizing community resilience: Revisiting conceptual distinctions (2016)The Development and Application of Sociological Neoinstitutionalism (2002) (2021)Theory of Value (1959)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt (1991)An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money (1958)Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)On the Economics of Subprime Lending (2005)The effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development (2007)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Law and Finance (1998)Do Liquidation Values Affect Financial Contracts? Evidence from Commercial Loan Contracts and Zoning Regulation (2004)Do Liquidation Values Affect Financial Contracts? Evidence from Commercial Loan Contracts and Zoning Regulation (2005)How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans (2005)Social Norms and Community Enforcement (1992)Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence (1997)Law, finance, and economic growth in China (2005)Social networks and informal financial inclusion in China (2018)Bank competition and corporate employment: Evidence from the geographic distribution of bank branches in China (2023)Community financing in entrepreneurship: A focus on women entrepreneurs in the developing world (2023)A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation (1927)Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior (2008)Tariffs, enforcement, and customs evasion: Evidence from India (2008)APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS TO TAX EVASION (2012)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data (1994)Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches (2008)Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information (2010)Innovation and SME finance: Evidence from developing countries (2019)Financial Inclusion in Emerging Economies: The Application of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Credit Risk Assessment (2021)The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism (1971)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution (2010)Formal and informal financing decisions of small businesses (2020)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification3,201 cited
  • 1980Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems354 cited

Cited by

  • 1994Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game328 cited
  • 2004Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly257 cited
  • 1999Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation244 cited
  • 2016Financing from Family and Friends239 cited
  • 2010Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information234 cited
  • 2002Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration**We are grateful to Wojciech Kopczuk for valuable research assistance. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were received from Jim Alm, Alan Auerbach, Len Burman, Brian Erard, Martin Feldstein, Firouz Gahvari, Roger Gordon, Jim Hines, Jonathan Kesselman, Louis Kaplow, Jim Poterba, Agnar Sandmo, Dan Shaviro, Eric Toder, Gideon Yaniv, the participants at the NYU Law School Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance and the handbook conference held at the University of California at Berkeley.219 cited
  • 2018Understanding informal financing218 cited
  • 2000Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable204 cited
  • 1992Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary198 cited
  • 2004Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption196 cited

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  • 1989Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits188 cited
  • 2000Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeconomic model188 cited
  • 1998Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance187 cited
  • 1996Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue180 cited
  • 1992Corruption in tax administration176 cited
  • 1996Innovation, bank monitoring, and endogenous financial development175 cited