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Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules
16 references·0 citing·36 second hop
Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules (2003)Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Votin…Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting (2004)Rational Choice Theory and th…Corporate Governance and Control (2003)Corporate Governance and Cont…Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors (2000)Corporate governance proposal…The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA‐CREF (1998)The Influence of Institutions…Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting (1998)Convicting the Innocent: The …Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information (1997)Voting Behavior and Informati…Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem (1996)Information Aggregation, Rati…The Swing Voter's Curse (1995)The Swing Voter's CurseThe Economic Structure of Corporate Law. (1993)The Economic Structure of Cor…The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors (1988)The distribution of power amo…Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments (1988)Ownership structure and votin…Shark repellents and stock prices (1987)Shark repellents and stock pr…The market for corporate control (1983)The market for corporate cont…Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth (1983)Antitakeover charter amendmen…Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Mergers and the Market for Co…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…The American Jury (1971)Information Pooling and Group Decision Making (1986)Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem (2001)Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science (2011)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)The Robust Beauty of Majority Rules in Group Decisions. (2005)Self-Enforcing Democracy (2011)Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (2014)American Economic Review (2019)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings (2006)The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey (2010)Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence (2018)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value (1990)INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1995)Law and Finance (1998)The Theory of Economic Development (2003)Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006)Performance and governance in microfinance institutions (2008)The Network of Global Corporate Control (2011)Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor (1991)Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS (1996)Environmental risk management and the cost of capital (2008)The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance (2010)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business (2003)Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
  • 1983The market for corporate control4,145 cited
  • 1965Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control2,364 cited
  • 2000Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors1,776 cited
  • 1988Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments1,600 cited
  • 1993The Economic Structure of Corporate Law.1,135 cited
  • 1996Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem1,063 cited
  • 2003Corporate Governance and Control894 cited
  • 1998The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA‐CREF833 cited
  • 1998Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting725 cited
  • 1995The Swing Voter's Curse650 cited
  • 1997Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information607 cited
  • 1983Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth475 cited
  • 1988The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors447 cited
  • 2004Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting440 cited

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  • 1987Shark repellents and stock prices407 cited
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