ESTIMATING THE DETERMINANTS OF TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE WITH EXPERIMENTAL DATA

Abstract

The fundamental difficulty in empirical work on taxpayer compliance is the absence of detailed and reliable information on individual compliance choices. This paper uses data from laboratory experiments to estimate individual responses to tax, penalty, and audit rate changes, as well as to changes in government expenditures. The empirical results confirm some (although not all) theoretical predictions, and compare quantitatively with other empirical work. Taxpayer reporting increases with greater audit and penalty rates; however, these responses are not large. Compliance is also greater when individuals face a lower tax rate and when they receive something for their taxes.

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