Responsibility Research for Trustworthy Autonomous Systems (Blue Sky Ideas Track)

Mehdi M. Dastani · Catholijn M. Jonker · Timothy J. Norman · Vahid Yazdanpanah

215 citations0/0 files storedePrints Soton (University of Southampton)

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Ethics and Social Impacts of AI Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy

Abstract

To develop and effectively deploy Trustworthy Autonomous Systems (TAS), we face various social, technological, legal, and ethical challenges in which different notions of responsibility can play a key role. In this work, we elaborate on these challenges, discuss research gaps, and show how the multidimensional notion of responsibility can play a role to bridge them. We argue that TAS requires operational tools to represent and reason about responsibilities of humans as well as AI agents. We review major challenges to which responsibility reasoning can contribute, highlight open research problems, and argue for the application of multiagent responsibility models in a variety of TAS domains.

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