Rationality and Dynamic Choice

Edward F. McClennen

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Economic Theory and Institutions

Abstract

This is a major contribution to the theory of rational choice which will be of particular interest to philosophers and economists. The author sets out the foundations of rational choice, and then sketches a dynamic choice framework in which principles of ordering and independence follow from a number of apparently plausible conditions. However, there is potential conflict among these conditions, and when they are weakened to avoid it the usual foundations of rational choice no longer prevail. The thrust of the argument is to suggest that the theory of rational choice is less deterministic than many suppose.

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