Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986

Nolan M. McCarty · Keith T. Poole

148 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Law Economics and Organization

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Electoral Systems and Political Participation American Constitutional Law and Politics Game Theory and Voting Systems

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Nolan M. McCarty, Keith T. Poole; Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986, The Journal

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References

1958An Economic Theory of Democracy.1985A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis 1970An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process 1990Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy 1984The spatial theory of voting 1991The President in the Legislative Arena, by Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond 1985Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress 1980Presidential influence in Congress

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2008Measuring Explicit Political Positions of Media 1998Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives 2002Agencies by Presidential Design 2005Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America 2001Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation 2004MODELS OF VETOES AND VETO BARGAINING 2004

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