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Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986

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1998Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives133 cited
2002Agencies by Presidential Design120 cited

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2005

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2004MODELS OF VETOES AND VETO BARGAINING106 cited

2001Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation106 cited

2004Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints, and the Lifetime of Bureaus101 cited

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2008D-Nominate after 10 Years: A Comparative Update To Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting93 cited

1996Voting and Vetoing92 cited

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