Diversification, industry structure, and firm strategy: An organizational economics perspective

Abstract

Ronald Coase's landmark 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm,” framed the study of organizational economics for decades. Coase asked three fundamental questions: Why do firms exist? What determines their boundaries? How should firms be organized internally? To answer the first question, Coase famously appealed to “the costs of using the price mechanism,” what we now call transaction costs or contracting costs, a concept that blossomed in the 1970s and 1980s into an elaborate theory of why firms exist (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Grossman & Hart, 1986). The second question has generated a huge literature in industrial economics, strategy, corporate finance, and organization theory. “Why,” as Coase (1937, pp. 393–394) put it, “does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more?” In Williamson's (1996, p. 150) words, “Why can't a large firm do everything that a collection of small firms can do and more?” As Coase recognized in 1937, the transaction-cost advantages of internal organization are not unlimited, and firms have a finite “optimum” size and shape. Describing these limits in detail has proved challenging, however.1

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