References

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• 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model2,127 cited
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• 1982Information, trade and common knowledge1,738 cited
• 1974Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies1,630 cited
• 1987Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality1,613 cited
• 1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game1,059 cited
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• 1982On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations959 cited
• 1985Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information774 cited
• 2016Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium