Efficient Mechanisms with Dynamic Populations and Dynamic Types

Abstract

We considerthe truthful implementation ofan efficient decisionpolicy when agents have dynamic type and are periodically-inaccessible, with agents unable to report type information or make payments while inaccessible. This concept of inaccessibility includes arrival-departure dynamics as a special case. We generalize the dynamic-VCG (or pivot) mechanism [Bergemann and Välimäki, 2010] to this environment, emphasizing its position within a family of dynamic Groves mechanisms. In considering the special case of arrival-departure dynamics and dynamic type, the mechanism is within-period ex post incentive compatible so long as arrivals are independent of past arrivals, conditioned on actions of the center. For arrival-departure dynamics and static types, the mechanism is payoff equivalent upon arrival to the online-VCG mechanism [Parkes and Singh, 2003], serving to unify two previously disparate mechanisms and highlighting a tradeoff between ex post participation and ex post no-deficit properties. This paper subsumes a previous version entitled “Efficient Online Mechanisms for Persistent, Periodically Inaccessible Self-Interested Agents”, dating from June, 2007. Thanks to the referees and editor of an earlier version for valuable feedback, seminar participants at Dagstuhl, Stonybrook,

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