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Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines · Study

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ArticleOptimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines

Konrad Mierendorff2015

OA

Articlegreen2015

Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines

Konrad Mierendorff

85 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Economic Theory

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

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References

1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS 1981Optimal Auction Design 1978Monopoly and product quality 2003Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Inventory Considerations: Research Overview, Current Practices, and Future Directions 2011Wiley encyclopedia of operations research and management science 1984Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers 1984A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm 2007Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior

Cited by

2012Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process 2013Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules 2015Dynamic screening with limited commitment 2008Optimal dynamic auctions 2012Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach 2009Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization

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2017Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demandarticle · 12 shared references 2014Mechanism Design and Approximationarticle · 11 shared references 2011Dynamic Auctionsother · 10 shared references 2015Optimal stopping with private informationarticle · 10 shared references 2008Optimal dynamic auctionspreprint · 10 shared references 2009Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approacharticle · 9 shared references

Details

Year2015

Typearticle

Published2015-11-20

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

ISSN-L0022-0531

Languageen

Citations85

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

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doi10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.007

openalex_workW2181125495

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2009Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency

2017Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand