Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making

Hal R. Arkes · Brittany L. Shoots‐Reinhard

36 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Behavioral Decision Making

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Jury Decision Making Processes Legal processes and jurisprudence Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Abstract

ABSTRACT Although the law assumes a close relation between the probability that a defendant committed the act in question and the ensuing verdict of the jurors, prior research has shown this assumption to be often violated. We present five experiments designed to show that factors that influence probability also influence verdict, but other factors are capable of directly producing changes in verdict without affecting probability. In Experiment 1, we replicated the Wells Effect; scenarios generating the same probability that the Blue Bus Company was to blame for the same accident, nevertheless, generated significantly different likelihoods of finding the defendant liable. In Experiment 2, we showed that equally diagnostic affirmative and negative evidence had differential effects on mock jurors' probability estimates and verdicts. In Experiment 3, we showed that a completely nondiagnostic witness, who either implicates the same bus company or a different bus company as did a diagnostic witness, significantly influenced mock jurors' verdicts. However, the nondiagnostic witness did not change the probability that the Blue Bus Company was responsible for the accident. In Experiment 4, we demonstrated that base rate and witness reliability information resulted in very similar probability estimates but radically different verdicts. In Experiment 5, we showed that a change in the diagnosticity of the evidence influenced both probability and verdict with the former mediating differences in the later. Because probability is only one of the several determinants of the verdict, the two dependent variables are not as closely related as the law presumes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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References

1974Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 1975Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 1973On the psychology of prediction.1983Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.1981Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.1993Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking 1988Contingent weighting in judgment and choice.1988Rational choice in an uncertain world

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