Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts

David Papineau

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and History of Science

Abstract

Abstract This chapter focuses on the topic of phenomenal concepts. It develops and extends the comparison of phenomenal concepts with so-called “perceptual concepts,” to throw the nature of phenomenal concepts into clearer focus. A position against a recent argument by David Chalmers against the whole type-B strategy of defending physicalism by appeal to phenomenal concepts is defended.

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References

1996The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory 1979The Problem of the Essential Indexical 1986What Mary Didn't Know 1990The Intrinsic Quality of Experience 1972Semantics of Natural Language 1988Consciousness and the Computational Mind 2002Thinking about Consciousness 2000On Clear and Confused Ideas

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2009There Are No Phenomenal Concepts 2012Acquaintance and the mind–body problem 2011In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 1 2015The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding 2010What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?2013Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument 2019Articulating a Thought 2020How literature expands your imagination

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