Manipulating Incentives to Enhance School Learning

Abstract

Recently there has been a great deal of interest in the use of to improve academic performance. The flurry of contracts between school systems and private firms, binding the latter to produce specified achievement gains in students in order to be paid for instructional services rendered (Education Turnkey Systems, 1970), has given rise to the notion that outside firms know something about causing students to learn that school personnel do not know. The recent stress on accountability in education (Lessinger, 1970) has also contributed to an interest in incentives. A corollary to accountability is that programs, personnel, or materials and equipment that do not contribute to desired student performance outcomes must face some kind of revision, possibly elimination, while those found effective should be appropriately rewarded (Hawkridge, 1970). Central to the emphasis on is the belief that the new educational programs of the past decade have not produced impressive results and have especially failed the so called deprived student. Whereas this failure has produced pessimism in some circles, other educators have thought enough of the power of currently available techniques to venture their own capital on a guaranteed-performance-or-no-pay basis. An examination of these techniques usually reveals a heavy emphasis on technological innovations and incentives to learners. The purpose of the present paper is to summarize the research on the use of to influence student performance. Demonstrated principles are identified and areas for further development are indicated. In an attempt to cover the entire range of possibilities for incentive manipulation, the paper focuses on theoretical rationales, types of incentive, target populations, modes of incentive delivery, timing of reinforcements, and criterion measures to assess incentive effectiveness.

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