this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connectionsReferences
- 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
- 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
- 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
- 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences6,243 cited
- 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
- 1992The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies3,591 cited
- 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
- 1995Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance2,088 cited
- 1991Executive incentives and the horizon problem1,554 cited
- 1997Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board1,529 cited
- 1996Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS1,291 cited
- 1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
- 1993Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies1,259 cited
- 1995Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?1,128 cited
- 1985Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results
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