Corroborating Testimony and Ignorance: A Reply to Bovens, Fitelson, Hartmann and Snyder

Erik J Olsson

35 citations0/0 files storedThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and History of Science Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

In an earlier paper, I objected to certain elements of L. Jonathan Cohen's account of corroborating testimony (Olsson [2002]). In their response to my article, Bovens, Fitelson, Hartmann and Snyder ([2002]) suggest some significant improvements of the probabilistic model which I used in assessing Cohen's theses and answer some additional questions which my study raised. More problematically, they also seek to defend Cohen against my criticism. I argue, in this reply, that their attempts in this direction are unsuccessful.

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References

1977The Probable and The Provable 1947An analysis of knowledge and valuation 1958Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.2002Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise 2002Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson

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2006Reliability conducive measures of coherence

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