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Optimal Contracts for Teams
13 references·16 citing·36 second hop
Optimal Contracts for Teams (1991)Optimal Contracts for TeamsProduction, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Production, Information Costs…Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules (1992)Dominant strategy implementat…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…The Impact of China's Economic Reforms on Agricultural Productivity Growth (1989)The Impact of China's Economi…Competition for Agency Contracts (1987)Competition for Agency Contra…Auctioning Incentive Contracts (1987)Auctioning Incentive ContractsUsing Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Using Cost Observation to Reg…Auctions and Bidding (1986)Auctions and BiddingThe Economics of Agency. (1984)The Economics of Agency.Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems (1982)Optimal coordination mechanis…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsEconomically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems (1980)Economically Optimal Performa…Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsDouble Counting in Supply Chain Carbon Footprinting (2013)Double Counting in Supply Cha…Project Management Contracts with Delayed Payments (2010)Project Management Contracts …Optimal time-based and cost-based coordinated project contracts with unobservable work rates (2010)Optimal time-based and cost-b…Teams, Autonomy, and the Financial Performance of Firms (2006)Teams, Autonomy, and the Fina…Team Size and Effort in Start-up Teams - Another Consequence of Free-Riding and Peer Pressure in Partnerships (2006)Team Size and Effort in Start…Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats (2005)Nonpoint pollution control: I…Testing ambient pollution instruments with heterogeneous agents (2004)Testing ambient pollution ins…Drivers of Team Performance: What Do We Know and What Have We Still To Learn? (2004)Drivers of Team Performance: …Taxes and Venture Capital Support (2003)Taxes and Venture Capital Sup…Governing the firm workers' control in theory and practice (2003)Governing the firm workers' c…Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards (2002)Exogenous targeting instrumen…Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort (1998)Knowledge as a public good: e…On the interrelation between production technology, job design, and incentives (1995)On the interrelation between …O rganizational D iseconomies of scale (1995)O rganizational D iseconomies…Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements (1991)Resolving Double Moral Hazard…Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions (1988)Government Intervention in Pr…The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts (1988)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function (1957)The theory of contracts (1987)HOW TO REFORM A PLANNED ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM CHINA (1992)Success and Failure of Reform: Insights from the Transition of Agriculture (2004)Understanding China's Growth: Past, Present, and Future (2012)Why Regulate Utilities? (1968)Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV (1976)A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm (1984)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization (2006)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Game Theory and Economic Modelling (1990)Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (1999)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)International Institutions: Two Approaches (1989)Chapter 11 The anatomy of health insurance (2000)The Next Generation of Research on IS Use: A Theoretical Framework of Delegation to and from Agentic IS Artifacts (2021)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1986Auctions and Bidding2,253 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
  • 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
  • 1984The Economics of Agency.923 cited
  • 1982Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems913 cited
  • 1989The Impact of China's Economic Reforms on Agricultural Productivity Growth644 cited
  • 1987Auctioning Incentive Contracts359 cited
  • 1980Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems354 cited
  • 1987Competition for Agency Contracts246 cited
  • 1992Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules232 cited

Cited by

  • 1995O rganizational D iseconomies of scale200 cited
  • 2013Double Counting in Supply Chain Carbon Footprinting183 cited
  • 1988Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

169 cited
  • 2003Governing the firm workers' control in theory and practice168 cited
  • 1991Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements146 cited
  • 2002Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards93 cited
  • 2003Taxes and Venture Capital Support81 cited
  • 2005Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats80 cited
  • 1995On the interrelation between production technology, job design, and incentives77 cited
  • 2004Drivers of Team Performance: What Do We Know and What Have We Still To Learn?69 cited
  • 2010Project Management Contracts with Delayed Payments62 cited
  • 1998Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort60 cited
  • 2006Teams, Autonomy, and the Financial Performance of Firms54 cited
  • 2010Optimal time-based and cost-based coordinated project contracts with unobservable work rates49 cited
  • 2004Testing ambient pollution instruments with heterogeneous agents46 cited
  • 2006Team Size and Effort in Start-up Teams - Another Consequence of Free-Riding and Peer Pressure in Partnerships44 cited