SZodixStudyAcademic Library

Shelves Open access

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

Agency Costs are not a “Flop”! · Study

ChapterShelves

ChapterAgency Costs are not a “Flop”!

Reinhard H. Schmidt1987

Chapter1987

Agency Costs are not a “Flop”!

Reinhard H. Schmidt

13 citations·0/0 files stored·Springer eBooks

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Economic Theory and Institutions

Abstract

No abstract was published for this record.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 13 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1983Separation of Ownership and Control 1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1983Agency Problems and Residual Claims 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship 1980Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science 1892The Theory of Value

Related works

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

2002Contractual and relational governance in family firms : effects on strategic decision-making quality and firm performancethesis · 6 shared references 1988The Information Economics Approach to Financial Reportingarticle · 6 shared references 2005Neoliberal Economics, Public Domains, and Organizationschapter · 6 shared references 1984The New Economics of Organizationarticle · 5 shared references 1988A survey of agency models of organizationsarticle · 5 shared references 1997DISAGGREGATING THE AGENCY CONTRACT: THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING, INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT, AND TERM IN OFFICE ON AGENT DECISION MAKING.article · 5 shared references

Details

Year1987

Typechapter

Published1987-01-01

VenueSpringer eBooks

Languageen

Citations13

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

Identifiers

doi10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_26

openalex_workW196747018

Links

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.