Member states and the European Commission: theoretical insights from the new economics of organization

Abstract

How to characterize the relationship between member governments and the European Commission has long been a matter of controversy among EU scholars. Although most now agree that traditional theoretical frameworks - inter-governmentalism and supranationalism - are inadequate to understand the complexities of EU governance, few viable alternatives have emerged. In this article, I provide a prospective look into a promising approach. The analytical framework is built on insights adapted from the new economics of organization (NEO). Specifically, I fuse the theoretical notion of incomplete contracting with principal - agent analytics to explain both the form and content of supranational delegation. The framework promises to offer scholars the means to get away from asking whether or not member governments dominate supranational institutions, to an inquiry wherein one can distinguish the conditions under which governments control supranational institutions from those where these institutions operate with a degree of autonomy.

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