On irony and negation

Abstract

In this article, irony is viewed as a mode of indirect negation. Based on this view, interpreting irony does not involve canceling the indirectly negated message and replacing it with the implicated one (as contended by, e.g., Clark & Gerrig, 1984; Grice, 1975). Rather, irony understanding involves processing both the negated and implicated messages, so that the difference between them may be computed. This view thus differs from the view which assumes that irony involves only one interpretation (e.g., Gibbs, 1986a; Sperber & Wilson, 1981; Wilson & Sperber, 1992). Holding that irony activates both the literal/explicit and the ironic/implicated meanings predicts that irony will be more difficult to understand than a nonironic use of the same utterance. Reanalysis of previous findings (Gibbs, 1986a) evinces that irony takes longer to process than nonironic use of the same utterance. Though irony is more difficult to understand than nonironic language, speakers apply this mode for certain communicative goals that are unattainable by direct negation. Direct negation may be vague, it may be face‐threatening, and in certain contexts, it may be dull. But, what is more important, it cannot point to the occasionally more desirable state of affairs indicated by the affirmative (literal) phrasing of the ironic utterance.

Cite this

Rachel Giora (1995). On irony and negation. Discourse Processes. https://doi.org/10.1080/01638539509544916

@article{rachel1995on,
  title  = {On irony and negation},
  author = {Giora, Rachel},
  year   = {1995},
  journal = {Discourse Processes},
  doi    = {10.1080/01638539509544916}
}

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