SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Truth and Correct Belief
3 references·16 citing·42 second hop
Truth and Correct Belief (2005)Truth and Correct BeliefThe Normativity of Content (2003)The Normativity of ContentHow Truth Governs Belief (2003)How Truth Governs BeliefWise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)Wise Choices, Apt FeelingsEqual treatment for belief (2018)Equal treatment for beliefEpistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief (2018)Epistemic Instrumentalism, Pe…How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes (2017)How (Not) to Think of Emotion…Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief (2017)Epistemic Utility Theory and …Cognitive Mobile Homes (2016)Cognitive Mobile HomesCan the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity? (2016)Can the aim of belief ground …How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief (2015)How to be a Normativist about…Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence (2015)Accuracy, Coherence, and Evid…Truth: the Aim and Norm of Belief* (2013)Truth: the Aim and Norm of Be…Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products (2013)Propositions, attitudinal obj…Changing Direction on Direction of Fit (2012)Changing Direction on Directi…What do we Aim At When we Believe? (2011)What do we Aim At When we Bel…Desire-satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal (2011)Desire-satisfaction and Welfa…"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent (2011)"Ought" and the Perspective o…Does thought imply ought? (2007)Does thought imply ought?Does thought imply ought? (2007)Does thought imply ought?The Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)The Moral Problem (1994)Articulating Reasons (2000)SHOULD WE TRUST ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE?; pp. 499–522 (2019)Desire as Belief (2021)Mental Imagery (2023)The Methods of Ethics (1962)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)The Possibility of Practical Reason (2000)Desire-fulfillment theory (2015)The Significance of a Life’s Shape (2015)Dead Wrong (2019)Normative Requirements (1999)Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (2007)Should I Believe the Truth? (2010)XV-The Russellian Retreat (2013)Why Ideal Epistemology? (2021)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. (1987)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1988)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism (2018)How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning? (2018)Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified (2021)Practical Reason and Norms (1999)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness (2013)Rationality Through Reasoning (2013)Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance (2016)What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!) (2016)Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. (1988)Anarchy, State, and Utopia (2018)Opting for the Best (2019)The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View* (2019)Inquiry and the epistemic (2021)Doxastic Deliberation (2005)Why Be Rational? (2005)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action (2006)Can We Believe the Error Theory? (2013)Fittingness First (2016)Thinking in Education (2003)Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory (2011)Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition (2013)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1990Wise Choices, Apt Feelings2,629 cited
  • 2003How Truth Governs Belief652 cited
  • 2003The Normativity of Content250 cited

Cited by

  • 2018Equal treatment for belief154 cited
  • 2007Does thought imply ought?132 cited
  • 2007Does thought imply ought?123 cited
  • 2011Desire-satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal118 cited
  • 2015Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence112 cited
  • 2011"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent111 cited
  • 2012Changing Direction on Direction of Fit104 cited
  • 2017Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief95 cited
  • 2011What do we Aim At When we Believe?91 cited
  • 2017How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes84 cited
  • 2016Cognitive Mobile Homes79 cited
  • 2016Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?78 cited
  • 2013Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products71 cited
  • 2015How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

64 cited
  • 2013Truth: the Aim and Norm of Belief*64 cited
  • 2018Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief63 cited